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Abstract 
To achieve an optimal capital structure, managers should determine the best level of debt and 
equity. Most research on corporate financial policy suggests that these decisions are made as 
a result of factors such as agency costs, bankruptcy costs, earnings variability and 
underinvestment. However, this determination is a costly and uncertain process for an 
individual firm. Therefore, this research intends to study the herding behavior of managers 
of Portuguese firms, whether an individual firm is sensitive to peer firms within the industry 
on capital structure decisions and whether peer firm behavior is driven by a leader-follower 
model in which less successful firms are influenced by more successful firms. Since there is 
controversy and lack of studies regarding this subject, it becomes relevant to contribute with 
new studies in this field. The results show that herding behavior is concentrated among 
smaller and less successful firms, which reveals more sensitivity to their peer firms than the 
counterparts within the industry, being consistent with the study made by Leary and Roberts 
(2014). However, only some followers’ firms are influenced by the capital structure of their 
more successful counterparts within the industry. 
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Resumo 
Para alcançar uma estrutura de capital ótima, os gestores devem determinar o melhor nível 
de dívida e capital próprio. A maioria das pesquisas sobre política financeira corporativa 
sugere que essas decisões são feitas como resultado de fatores como custos de agência, custos 
de falência, variabilidade de ganhos e baixo investimento. No entanto, essa determinação é 
um processo dispendioso e incerto para uma empresa individual. Posto isto, esta pesquisa 
pretende estudar o efeito de rebanho dos gestores de empresas Portuguesas, analisando se 
uma empresa individual é sensível às empresas homólogas dentro da indústria em decisões 
de estrutura de capital e se o comportamento de uma empresa homóloga é conduzido por um 
modelo líder-seguidor em que empresas menos bem-sucedidas são influenciadas por 
empresas mais bem-sucedidas. Uma vez que existe controvérsia e falta de estudos sobre este 
assunto, torna-se relevante contribuir com novos estudos neste campo. Os resultados 
mostram que o efeito de rebanho está concentrado entre as empresas mais pequenas e menos 
bem-sucedidas, o que revela mais sensibilidade às suas empresas homólogas do que as 
contrapartes da indústria, sendo consistente com o estudo realizado por Leary e Roberts 
(2014). Contudo, apenas algumas empresas seguidoras são influenciadas pela estrutura de 
capital de empresas bem-sucedidas dentro da indústria. 
 
Palavras-chave: Efeito de rebanho, Estrutura de capitais, Empresa líder, Empresa seguidora, 
Indústria. 
Classificação JEL: G30, G32, G14 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of determining an appropriate capital structure is that it allows firms to 
reduce their cost of financing and maximize their value. Managers to reach an optimal capital 
structure should determine the best level of debt and equity. Finance theories suggest that the 
capital structure decisions are made as a result of factors such as agency costs, non-debt tax 
shields, earnings variability, bankruptcy costs and underinvestment. However, for the 
individual firm, this determination is a costly and uncertain process and hard to measure.  
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), most research on corporate financial policy has been 
dedicated to explaining differences in the capital structure of firms, assuming the capital 
structure decisions are determined independently of the actions or characteristics of their peer 
firms. Consequently, the role of herding behavior in determining capital structure is often 
ignored, assuming there is no impact on its firm-specific determinants. 
Many authors have studied whether herding behavior matters for corporate capital structure 
decisions. Filbeck et al. (1996) found no support for herding behavior of firms and weak 
support for capital structure decisions on following some industry leader. Furthermore, Oruç 
and Sen (2009) did not find significant effect in the sense of following sector averages or 
following leverage level of leader firms on capital structure decisions. However, more recent 
research has shown that peer firm behavior in capital structure has large impact on its 
determination (Leary and Roberts, 2014). Moreover, Frank and Goyal (2009), Welch (2004), 
and MacKay and Phillips (2005) show that the industry average leverage ratios have a 
significant influence on firms’ capital structures. Damodaran (2010) also suggests that firms 
tend to follow the leader firm within the industry, hoping to mimic its success. Given this, 
and since there is controversy and lack of studies regarding this subject, it becomes relevant 
to come with new researches in this field.  
In this research, the main goals are to identify whether an individual firm is sensitive to peer 
firms within the industry on capital structure decisions and whether peer firm behavior is 
driven by a leader-follower model in which less successful firms are influenced by more 
successful firms. Managers are insecure of how to determine the optimal capital structure, 
and so, they may consider the characteristics and the financial policy decisions of peer firms 
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as informative for their own choices. The research sample is composed by 85 Portuguese 
firms of 9 industries and comprises data over the period between 2007 and 2015. 
The results show that, compared to firm-specific characteristics, peer firm financial policies 
have a significantly larger impact on capital structure, suggesting that the primary channel 
through which peer firms may influence capital structure is via peer firms’ policy decisions. 
Moreover, we also conclude that smaller and less successful firms are more sensitive to their 
peers than are the leaders within the industry, being consistent with the conclusion of the 
study made by Leary and Roberts (2014). However, only some followers are influenced by 
the capital structure decisions of their more successful counterparts within the industry. 
The structure of this study will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, a literature review about the 
topic is made, in which is presented the main theoretical models of capital structure and their 
characteristics, the herding behavior concept and its influence on capital structure decisions, 
and the main approaches and results of similar studies. In Chapter 3, the methodological 
considerations of the study are described, including the empirical model and variables’ 
description, the data collected and the descriptive statistics for each of the variables we used 
in the analysis. The Chapter 4 presents the results and its analysis, concerning peer firm 
effects in determining capital structure. Lastly, in Chapter 5, we present the conclusions and 
limitations of the study, and suggestions for further research. 
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2. Literature Review 
This section is divided into three different subsections; the first one presents the main 
theoretical models concerning capital structure and their characteristics. The second 
subsection presents the herding behavior concept and its influence on managers’ decisions. 
Lastly, the third subsection synthesizes the main contributions and results from previous 
studies related to herding behavior in capital structure decisions. 
2.1. Capital Structure 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), most research on corporate financial policy has been 
dedicated to explaining factors and differences in the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Consequently, an important question in financial theory and practice has remained ‘how to 
determine the optimal capital structure’, which is crucial to decide the financial decision-
making.  
In this section, there will be presented the Modigliani and Miller contributions, the main 
capital structure theories and a review of the empirical studies in determining capital 
structure. 
2.1.1. Modigliani and Miller Contributions 
The capital structure issue has been discussed since Modigliani and Miller (1958). The 
importance of determining an optimal capital structure is that it allows firms to reduce their 
cost of financing and maximize their value.  
According to the Proposition I of those authors, the value maximization of firm is 
independent of its capital structure, assuming perfect capital markets, no personal or 
corporate taxes and the independence of financing and investment decisions. However, there 
are market imperfections and therefore most of the capital structure models are based on their 
existence. 
Posteriorly, in 1963, Modigliani and Miller made an adjustment to their previous paper. They 
found that the capital structure is not irrelevant to maximize the value of the company, due 
to the dependence of firm’s market value on the tax rate, on the expected return of tax and on 
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the degree of leverage. However, although the debt is related to a tax shield, they argue that 
it does not mean that firms should be solely financed by debt. Firstly, there are several 
alternatives of financing that can be cheaper, like the retained earnings. Secondly, some 
lenders restrict the amount they lend to a given company. And finally, the data collected by 
the authors did not demonstrate that the leverage increases with high tax rates, which means 
higher tax advantages.  
Thus, knowing that the way a firm is financed is important for its valuation and the markets 
have frictions, several theories of firm capital structure have emerged. 
2.1.2. Capital Structure Theories 
The traditional finance on formation of capital structure presented the three following 
theories: Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Market Timing Theory. 
Trade-off theory, suggested by Myers (1984), considers that to reach an optimal capital 
structure, the firm’s debt ratio should be determined by a balance of the costs and benefits of 
corporate and personal income tax, impact of potential agency costs and bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs, since the firm may not realize value maximization when it uses only 
liabilities or does not use liabilities to define its capital structure. Furthermore, according to 
this theory, the debt financing can bring tax avoidance; however, the bankruptcy risk will be 
higher when the debt levels rise, at the same time the financing costs will increase. 
According to the Pecking Order theory, proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), the capital 
structure of a firm is formed by taking into account the priorities of different sources to meet 
financial requirements. Thus, to minimize asymmetric information and financing costs, firms 
should finance new investments, first internally with retained earnings, then with low-risk 
debt, and finally with equity only as a last option. 
In more recent years, the Market Timing Theory which was proposed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) defended that the capital structure is a cumulative outcome of past attempts to explore 
the market opportunities, being not associated with the existence of an optimal capital 
structure. This theory argues that the firms have the tendency to issue equity when market-
to-book ratios are high and repurchase when market value is lower than its book value. 
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Many other studies based on the existence of imperfections on capital markets were carried 
out in order to help explaining the differences between the average capital structures among 
industries. Therefore, most research on corporate financial policy suggests that the capital 
structure decisions are made as a result of the following factors: agency costs, non-debt tax 
shields, bankruptcy costs, asset redeployment, and underinvestment. 
The agency conflicts are generated by the divergence of interests between the managers and 
shareholders of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as the sum of: 
“the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and 
the residual loss.” (p. 308). They argued that an optimal capital structure can be achieved by 
balancing the agency costs and benefits of debt. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) formulated a model of corporate leverage decision in which 
personal and corporate tax treatment of debt and equity exists. The existence of non-debt 
corporate tax shields, such as depreciation deductions, depletion allowances, and investment 
tax credits, leads to a market equilibrium in which each firm has a single optimum leverage 
decision. 
Bradley et al. (1984) developed a model that synthesizes the balancing theory of firm’s 
optimal capital structure. This model includes positive personal taxes on equity and on bond 
income, the expected costs of financial distress (agency costs and bankruptcy costs), and the 
level of non-debt tax shields. Their analysis suggests that the variability of firm earnings is 
related inversely to the optimal firm leverage when costs of financial distress are significant. 
Most studies said that, under market imperfection, bankruptcy consequences arise and the 
trade-off between the tax subsidy and the bankruptcy costs makes possible an optimal capital 
structure. Haugen and Senbet (1987) challenged this view by arguing that bankruptcy costs, 
which affect the capital structure decisions, must be insignificant or nonexistent if one simply 
assumes that capital market prices are determined by rational investors. 
Williamson (1988) stated that whether the financing of a project should be by debt or by 
equity depends mainly on the assets’ characteristics. Transaction-cost reasoning supports the 
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use of equity to finance non-redeployable assets, while redeployable assets are financed by 
debt. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) developed a model of the issue-invest decision under the 
assumption of the firm’s managers have superior information. This model suggests that firms 
may refuse to issue common stock, and therefore may not take a valuable investment 
opportunity. Moreover, it also suggests justifications for several aspects of corporate 
financing behavior, such as the tendency to rely on internal sources of funds, and to prefer 
debt instead of equity when external financing is required. 
2.1.3. Determinants of Capital Structure 
Many researchers have been studying the influence of the theories described above and 
attempting to find the determinants of firms’ capital, which can be connected to firm-specific 
characteristics, or can be influenced by the macroeconomic environment and industry 
conditions. 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), in their summary from the existing literature, the 
characteristics of firm usually claimed to have some impact on corporate leverage decisions 
are the amount of fixed assets hold by firms, the nondebt tax shields, the investment 
opportunities, the firm’s size, the volatility, the advertising expenditure, the probability of 
bankruptcy, the profitability and uniqueness of the product. Although the influence of each 
of these factors may differ across studies, in our study we will only focus on the following 
determinants of capital structure: profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, industry 
conditions, and the nature of assets. 
a) Profitability 
According to Pecking Order Theory, more profitable firms will become less levered over 
time because they prefer internal finance instead of external funds. Thus, a negative relation 
of profitability on leverage would be expected (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Fan et al. (2012) 
and Hall et al. (2004) also found a negative relation between profitability and debt, and 
between profitability and short-term debt, respectively. 
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On the other hand, Trade-off Theory predicts a positive relation between profitability and 
leverage whether the market for corporate control is effective and forces firms to commit 
managers to use the internal resources in a responsible manner. Furthermore, profitable firms 
face lower expected costs of financial distress and have interest tax shields more valuable, 
and so, under the tax and the bankruptcy costs perspective, these firms use more debt (Jensen, 
1986).  
b) Firm Size 
Larger firms tend to be more diversified and to face lower default risk (Ferri and Jones, 1979). 
Furthermore, older firms have better reputations in debt markets and so they tend to face 
lower debt-related agency costs. Therefore, the Trade-off theory expects that more mature 
and larger firms have more debt. 
By contrast, the Pecking Order theory predicts an inverse relation between leverage and firm 
age and between leverage and firm size. Larger firms are better known, older firms collect 
retained earnings and younger firms need to raise external funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2004). 
c) Growth Opportunities 
Growth increases costs of financial distress, decreases problems of free cash flow, and 
intensifies agency problems related with debt. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a 
negative relation between growth opportunities and the debt level, reducing the firm’s 
leverage. 
Moreover, the Market Timing theory supports that firms prefer to issue equity when the stock 
price is high relative to earnings or book value, since they can sell the new shares at higher 
prices, and therefore, reducing the amount of debt. Thus, growth opportunities and leverage 
are negatively related under this theory, as it was pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and by Antoniou et al. (2002). For Frank and Goyal (2009) and Fan et al. (2012), this relation 
is also inverse.  
In opposition, the Pecking Order theory suggests that firms with more investments projects 
will need more external funds, thus, debt is preferred against equity (Myers and Majluf, 
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1984). So, this theory predicts a positive relation between growth opportunities and leverage. 
Nevertheless, Ozkan (2001) and other researchers, found evidence that support a negative 
relation, arguing that firms may be prevented from issuing more debt with the existence of 
risky debt on their balance sheets, overlooking some investment opportunities.  
d) Industry Conditions 
The leverage ratios across industries present significant variation, as it was pointed out by 
Ross et al. (2008), and by Lemmon et al. (2008). These differences have several possible 
interpretations. 
First, managers to contemplate their own firm’s leverage, they maybe use industry median 
leverage as a reference. Therefore, industry median leverage is regularly used as a proxy for 
target capital structure (Gilson, 1997; Hull, 1999; Hovakimian et al. 2001). Hovakimian et 
al. (2001) show that firms actively adjust their debt ratios according to the industry average. 
Second, industry effects exhibit a set of correlated factors, although they are omitted. In the 
same industry, firms tend to face mutual forces that influence their financing choices. These 
could reflect product market interactions or the nature of competition, and industry 
heterogeneity, such as the business risk, technology, types of assets, or regulation.  
Welch (2004), and MacKay and Phillips (2005) show that the industry average leverage 
ratios have a significant influence on firms’ capital structures. Moreover, Frank and Goyal 
(2009) take into consideration two industry variables, the industry median leverage and the 
industry median growth. According to Trade-off theory, higher industry median leverage 
should result in more debt, while higher industry median growth should result in less debt. 
The Pecking Order theory predicts that the industry is only considered when it serves as a 
proxy for the firm’s financing deficit. Under the Market Timing perspective, the industry is 
only considered whether valuations are correlated across firms in an industry.  
e) Nature of Assets 
Ferri and Jones (1979) found that tangible assets have a negative impact on leverage, as this 
type of assets can increase the variability of firm’s income, delaying the access to debt. Hall 
et al. (2004) also support this theory, but only for short-term debt.  
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On the other hand, according to Michaelas et al. (1999) (and Hall et al. (2004) for the long-
term), the higher the amount of tangible assets, the higher the debt level that firm will have 
on its capital structure. Due to that, the tangible assets can be used as collateral in debt 
contracts and lenders will ask for a low risk premium. Furthermore, the use of funds produced 
by managers is limited when there are collaterals in a debt contract, which it reduces the 
agency costs. Consequently, under the Trade-off theory, the relation between leverage and 
tangibility is positive (Zurigat, 2009). The Pecking Order theory also predicts this positive 
effect, once the assets used as collateral will enable to issue debt at interesting rates. Other 
researchers, such as Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan et al. (2012), 
and Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre (2014), had the same results. Antoniou et al. (2002) 
discover evidence that support both the negative and the positive effect between leverage and 
tangible assets. 
Table 1 – Determinants of capital structure and their impact on leverage, according to the 
different theories 
Theory/  
Determinant 
Trade-off 
Theory 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
Market-timing 
Theory 
Expected 
Signal 
Profitability + -  - 
Firm Size + -  + 
Growth 
Opportunities 
- + - - 
Nature of 
Assets 
+ +  + 
 
2.2. Herding Behavior 
Under the research perspective of bounded rational individuals and groups, Behavioral 
Finance theory concerns about irrational investors and managers, who have impact on firm’s 
capital allocation behavior and performance. It also considers influence of psychological 
factors in financial decisions. The market timing hypothesis of corporate financing, brought 
by Shefrin (2000), explores the agents’ irrational behavior on capital structure decisions. 
Although the theoretical hypothesis of traditional finance theory is the rational agent and 
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effective market, the theoretical basis of behavioral finance is restricted rationality and 
limited arbitrage. 
Keynes (1936) proposed that the investment of non-rational investor will have the influence 
the company financing behavior, to certain level, the investment activity is affected by the 
stock dealer's average anticipation, but not controlled by entrepreneur's average anticipation. 
Furthermore, he suggested that professional managers will "follow the herd" if they worry 
about how others will evaluate their capacity to make decisions.  
There are two ways of herding behavior, the irrational and rational. Focused on manager 
psychology, the irrational way of herding behavior suggests that individuals are irrational 
when they behave by herd instinct. People in groups have the tendency to think and behave 
similarly which suggests some kind of irrationality, such as loyalty-induced psychological 
incentive to be in agreement with the group members (Shiller, 1995). On the other hand, 
regarding to the rational way, several studies have been developed to explain why rational 
individuals behave together: informational cascades, agency reputation based models and 
information inefficiencies.  
The more common explanation for herding behavior is informational cascades. It occurs 
when an individual acquires information in sequence by observing the actions of those ahead 
of him, and follows the behavior of the preceding individual ignoring his own information 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003). Moreover, Devenow and 
Welch (1996) show that informational cascades may justify the decisions of managers when 
they assume debt because, without an optimal model, the managers may follow the choice 
from peer firms. 
An alternative explanation is reputational risk: under certain circumstances, managers tend 
to mimic the investment decisions of other managers, disregarding their own personal 
information. This behavior is inefficient from the social angle, but it can be rational from the 
perspective of managers who care about their professional reputations, i.e., herding behavior 
is considered more important than making efficient investment decisions because blame is 
undertaken together in the case of a bad result (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Furthermore, 
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the implicit incentives encourage managers to herd more during the progress of their career 
(Boyson, 2010).  
Lastly, herding behavior could be a consequence from the way investors deal with 
information: investors may prefer to use only private information shared by other investors, 
instead of their own information. Thus, resource allocation concerning information 
acquisition is inefficient (Froot et al. 1992). 
The specialists in Behavioral finance consider that corporate financing decision is the dispute 
between firms and the capital market, and this decision is connected to capital market 
conditions. Hovakimian et al. (2001) stated that the research of capital structure has ignored 
the capital market supply condition that has influence on corporate financing decision, i.e., 
this decision should pay more attention to the deviations of capital market financing 
condition, than to a trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt and equity financing. 
Most studies about the capital structure usually adopt the traditional finance theory, but this 
research will carry on discussion from the behavior finance's perspective, using herding 
behavior of managers to explain corporate financing decisions. 
2.3. Related Research – Herding Behavior in Capital Structure decisions 
Herding behavior in capital structure decisions can arise for a diversity of reasons. For 
instance, financial policy mimicking could be caused by interactions between financial 
structure and product market competition. According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), firms 
with high leverage will mimic the financial policies of their less-levered rivals, when the 
expected cost of the predatory price competition from less-levered firms is severe enough. 
Moreover, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) present a model in which the investments of 
firms with high leverage are affected by an industry decline, losing market share to more 
conservatively financed rivals, which can lead to a mimicking behavior of the more 
conservative leverage policies of their peer firms. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) present a duopoly market model in which capital structure 
mimicking among competitors is generated by the reactions and comments between product 
markets and financial policy. This interaction is also examined by Maksimovic and Zechner 
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(1991). Nevertheless, in contrast to herding behavior, the implications of this study are led 
more in the direction of differential positioning within the industry. 
Some studies have focused on investigating whether peer firms effect matters for financial 
policy. Hereafter, there are introduced some of the most important empirical studies’ results 
concerning herding behavior in determining capital structure decisions. 
Zeckhauser et al. (1991) propose the “herd migration” theory, which suggests that managers 
may reveal herding behavior in capital structure policies by following average debt-equity 
ratio of the sector. They find low level of meaningful herd behavior in three sectors 
considered and high level in seven sectors, based on the sample of 182 U.S. firms of 10 
sectors based on two-digit SIC codes from the period of 1971-1989. 
Filbeck et al. (1996) examine the tendency to keep the capital structure decisions according 
to the industry from a sample of 120 U.S. firms among 4 industries during the period 1981 
to 1990.They find no support for herding behavior of firms and weak support for capital 
structure decisions on following some industry leader. 
Oruç and Şen (2009) study the influence of herd psychology on capital structure decisions of 
45 firms listed in ISE (Istanbul Stock Exchange) of 4 industries from the period of 1999-
2006. They do not find significant effect in the sense of following sector averages or 
following leverage level of leader firms on capital structure decisions. 
Lastly, Leary and Roberts (2014) analyze the peer firm behavior in determining corporate 
capital structures and financial policies for a sample of 9126 U.S. firms of 217 industries 
based on three-digit SIC code over the period from 1965 to 2008. The authors report that peer 
firm behavior in corporate capital structure has large impact on its determination, larger than 
any other determinant. They conclude that “Mimicking behavior is concentrated among 
smaller, younger, less successful, and more financially constrained firms. By contrast, 
industry leaders are not influenced by the financial policy choices of their less successful 
peers.” (Leary and Roberts, 2014, p. 173). 
Given this, the previous studies do not present consensus on the influence of herding behavior 
in capital structure decisions. Moreover, the majority of the studies focus on U.S. firms (e.g. 
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Zeckhauser et al., 1991; Filbeck et al., 1996; Leary and Roberts, 2014) or on Turkish firms 
(e.g. Oruç and Sen, 2009). As such, and since there is controversy and lack of studies 
regarding this subject, it becomes relevant to come with new researches in this field. 
Therefore, the present research will differentiate because it is applied to a Portuguese sample, 
studying whether firms are sensitive to peer firms within the industry on financial policy 
decisions and whether less successful firms are influenced by more successful firms. 
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3. Methodology and Sample Selection 
This section is divided into three different subsections; the first one presents the empirical 
model and describes the respective variables. The second subsection describes the data that 
was collected. And, the last one presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables 
that were used in the analysis.  
3.1. The Empirical Model 
In order to better understand the impact of peer effects in determining variation on corporate 
leverage ratios across firms of the same industry, there were considered some factors that 
have influence in the capital structure decisions. The empirical model of capital structure 
followed was developed by Leary and Roberts (2014), based on the empirical capital 
structure literature of previous studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009).  
The empirical model (3.1) is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉_𝐴𝑉𝐺−𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝐴𝑉𝐺−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹_𝐴𝑉𝐺−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺_𝐴𝑉𝐺−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻_𝐴𝑉𝐺−𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
 
(3.1) 
Where i refers to the firm, j to the industry and t to the year period. Peer firm average 
characteristics and firm-specific characteristics are lagged 1-year to reduce the problem of 
endogeneity, and to determine their influence on firm leverage by observing the previous 
period. 
Variables Description 
Leverage (LEV) – The dependent variable is a measure of capital structure policy. This 
variable is calculated using the ratio between Total Debt and Book Value of Total Assets, 
proposed by Ferri and Jones (1979).  
Peer firm averages measure the influence of peer firm actions and characteristics on capital 
structure decisions. 
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• Leverage (LEV_AVG) – According to Frank and Goyal (2009), the median industry 
leverage has a positive and significant influence on firm leverage. Welch (2004), and 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) also consider that this is an economically important 
factor for firm’s capital structure. Ferri and Jones (1979), Bradley et al. (1984), 
Michaelas et al. (1999), and Chui et al. (2002) present that the type of industry 
impacts a firm’s capital structure. 
• Characteristics (SIZE_AVG, PROF_AVG, TANG_AVG, GROWTH_AVG) – We 
average each characteristic, described below, of all firms within an industry-year 
combination, excluding the ith observation, to measure the impact of peer effects on 
financial policy choices.  
Firm-specific characteristics: 
• Firm Size (SIZE) is proxied by the natural Logarithm of Sales (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Leary and Roberts, 2014). According to Wooldridge (2002), the use of the 
natural logarithm allows to limit the range of the variable, making this variable less 
sensitive to extreme observations. 
• Profitability (PROF) is calculated by the ratio of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) to Total Assets (Chui et al., 2002). The use of EBIT, in place of other measures 
of earnings, allows to compare firms with different capital structures. 
• Asset Tangibility (TANG) corresponds to the ratio between Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (PPE) and Total Assets, following the approach of Michaelas et al. 
(1999), Hall et al. (2004) and Fan et al. (2012). 
• Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) are proxied by the change in Logarithm of Total 
Assets, that represents outflows (Frank et al., 2009). According to Shyam-Sunder et 
al. (1999), it directly increases the financing deficit. In the literature, there are some 
proxies for growth opportunities. Barclay and Smith (1995) and other capital structure 
researchers measure by the market-to-book ratio. Unfortunately, since most firms are 
not traded, the market value of assets is not available.  
The reasons for choosing the firm characteristics mentioned above as the main determinants 
of capital structure are as follow: they have presented most consistently as being correlated 
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with leverage in previous studies (Bradley et al., 1984; Long and Malitz, 1985; Harris and 
Raviv, 1991). In addition, the data available severely restricts the capacity to develop proxies 
for other determinants.  
Table 2 – Summary of the dependent variable and firm-specific characteristics’ variables 
Variables Proxy Variable Expected Signal 
Dependent Variable 
Leverage Total Debt/ Total Assets  
Explanatory Variables (Firm-specific characteristics) 
Firm Size Logarithm of Sales + 
Profitability EBIT/ Total Assets - 
Asset Tangibility PPE/ Total Assets + 
Growth Opportunities Change in Logarithm of Total Assets - 
 
3.2. Sample Selection and Data 
The data was extracted from the database Sabi, provided by Bureau Van Dijk, in an annual 
basis, from the period of 2006 to 2015. From it, it was possible to collect the annual reports 
of firms for which accounting data necessary to calculate the dependent variable and the firm-
specific characteristics was available. To avoid capital structures dictated by regulatory 
considerations, it was excluded financial firms, utilities and government entities. 
Furthermore, it was also excluded subsidiaries’ firms controlled by non-Portuguese 
companies. Moreover, due to the proxy variable used for growth opportunities and to the fact 
that the firms’ characteristics are lagged 1-year, the final period excludes two years (2006 
and 2007). After these adjustments, the final sample consists of 680 firm-year observations 
corresponding to 85 firms with non-missing data for all analysis variables in study from the 
period of 2008 to 2015 (8 years).  
The industry groups are defined by three-digit CAE-Rev.31 code. Additionally, the 
industries’ selection is based on the following criteria: they should have at least 5 firms with 
non-missing data for all analysis variables. Given this, there are 9 industries represented in 
the sample; 11 firms in the aquaculture industry (032. Aquacultura), 11 firms in the extractive 
industries not specified (089. Indústrias extractivas, n.e.), 10 firms in the manufacture of 
                                                          
1 CAE-Rev. 3 - Classificação Portuguesa de Atividades Económicas, Revisão 3. 
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pulp, paper and paperboard industry (171. Fabricação de pasta, de papel e cartão (excepto 
canelado)), 5 firms in the manufacture of refined petroleum products and fuel pellets industry 
(192. Fabricação de produtos petrolíferos refinados e de aglomerados de combustíveis), 7 
firms in the manufacture of cement, lime and plaster industry (235. Fabricação de cimento, 
cal e gesso), 10 firms in the manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment (262 - 
Fabricação de computadores e de equipamento periférico), 13 firms in the shipbuilding 
industry (301. Construção naval), 9 firms in the wastewater collection, drainage and 
treatment industry (370. Recolha, drenagem e tratamento de águas residuais), and 9 firms in 
the air passenger transport industry (511. Transportes aéreos de passageiros). 
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
 Levels 
Mean Median Max Min SD 
Peer Firm Averages      
Leverage 0.649 0.645 1.110 0.362 0.143 
Firm Size 6.323 5.969 7.841 5.025 0.747 
Growth  0.062 0.006 0.787 -0.118 0.166 
Profitability 0.040 0.038 0.177 -0.087 0.046 
Tangibility 0.300 0.285 0.627 0.065 0.102 
Firm-Specific Characteristics      
Leverage 0.649 0.661 3.104 0.003 0.364 
Firm Size 6.323 6.250 10.036 2.777 1.189 
Growth 0.062 0.006 2.231 -0.449 0.236 
Profitability 0.040 0.031 0.391 -0.613 0.103 
Tangibility 0.300 0.232 1.000 0.000 0.241 
Industry Characteristics      
No. of Firms per Industry-year 9.444 10.000 13.000 5.000 2.351 
Total No. of Industries 9     
Sample Characteristics      
Observations 680     
Firms 85     
Table 3 presents means, medians, maximum, minimum, and standard deviations (SD) for variables of 85 firms 
over the period 2008 to 2015. Peer firm averages correspond to variables constructed as the average of all firms 
within an industry-year combination, not including the ith observation. Firm-specific characteristics correspond 
to variables constructed as firm i’s value in year t. Industries are defined by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code.  
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each variable we use in the analysis. Variables are 
divided into two different groups: peer firm averages and firm-specific characteristics. Peer 
firm averages correspond to variables constructed as the average of all firms within an 
industry-year combination, not including the ith observation. Firm-specific characteristics 
correspond to variables constructed as firm i’s value in year t (Leary and Roberts, 2014). For 
example, considering the Transportes Aéreos Portugueses, S.A. firm, peer firm averages, for 
each variable, correspond to the average of all firms in the air passenger transport industry, 
excluding the TAP, S.A. variables. These variables that were excluded are designated by firm-
specific characteristics. 
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4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results of the regressions analysis (3.1), which is divided into 
four different subsections. Firstly, we present and analyze the results of the basic empirical 
model. Secondly, the conclusions concerning the sensitivity of peer’s financial policies of 
some firms within the industry are described. Then, we present more directly if peer firm 
behavior is driven by a leader-follower model in which less successful firms are influenced 
by more successful firms. Lastly, we perform robustness tests to complement the previous 
subsections and the empirical analysis. 
4.1. Basic Empirical Model 
The results of the estimation of equation (3.1) are presented in Table 4. Additionally, in 
model (1) is also presented the results without the peer firm average variables. 
In order to find the most appropriate model, we perform three statistic tests: F-test, Breush-
Pagan Lagrande multiplier (LM) and the Hausman test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980; Hausman, 
1978). First, the F-test identifies whether the observed and unobserved fixed effects are equal 
across all units. The p-value is significant, validating the fixed effects model. Then, we 
perform the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (Breusch and Pagan, 1980), which allows 
us to choose between pooled OLS and random effects. The result rejects the null hypothesis, 
so pooled OLS model is not suitable. Lastly, in order to help us to choose the most appropriate 
model between the fixed effects and random effects models, we perform the Hausman (1978) 
test. The probability of this test suggests that the most appropriate model is the fixed effects 
model. 
Therefore, the most suitable model includes industry and year dummies to control for 
variables that are constant across industries and over time, respectively, and to capture the 
influence of aggregate trends. Furthermore, in order to validate our inference, we perform 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Finally, we also perform the Wald test. The p-
value is significant, suggesting that the industry and year dummies are globally significant. 
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Table 4 – Estimation results for the total sample 
 Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
c 0.652*** 
(5.002) 
3.929*** 
(4.325) 
-0.153 
(-1.455) 
Peer Firm Averages    
Leverage - -2.784*** 
(-7.374) 
-0.425*** 
(-2.615) 
Firm Size - -0.263** 
(-2.184) 
0.153*** 
(3.948) 
Growth - -0.055 
(-0.261) 
0.193 
(0.827) 
Profitability - -1.886*** 
(-3.626) 
-1.543*** 
(-4.418) 
Tangibility - -1.027*** 
(-2.896) 
0.645*** 
(5.364) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics     
Firm Size -0.014 
(-0.650) 
-0.045* 
(1.767) 
0.008 
(0.467) 
Growth -0.289** 
(-2.557) 
-0.231*** 
(-2.674) 
-0.277** 
(-2.482) 
Profitability -0.483** 
(-2.193) 
-0.516*** 
(-2.646) 
-0.629*** 
(-2.932) 
Tangibility -0.220*** 
(-3.447) 
-0.267*** 
(-3.922) 
-0.132** 
(-2.240) 
    
R2 0.178 0.377 0.148 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.354 0.127 
F-statistic 7.510*** 16.500*** 7.195*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Not Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Observations 680 680 680 
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). Model (1) excludes from the 
equation the peer firm average variables. Model (2) and (3) present, respectively, the results 
with and without industry fixed effects. The dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries 
are defined by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics’ variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-statistics robust 
to heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance 
is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  
 
The R-square value of the model (2) shows that 37.7% of the variance regarding the firm 
leverage is explained by the independent variables. Furthermore, the p-value of the F-test 
indicates a high accuracy and confidence of the independent variables to explain the 
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dependent variable. The adjusted R-square of the model (2) is 20% greater than the model 
(1), which means that the factors which capture the potential herding behavior (i.e., peer firm 
averages) help to understand managers' decisions. Although the model (1) and (3) are also 
presented for comparison analysis, our analysis in this subsection is focused on the results of 
the model (2), following the approach of Leary and Roberts (2014). 
Concerning the firm-specific characteristics, all capital structure determinants chosen are 
significant in explaining the level of leverage, which reinforces what was shown in previous 
studies (Bradley et al., 1984; Long and Malitz, 1985; Harris and Raviv, 1991). The negative 
impact of the growth opportunities on debt level is related to the existence of intangible assets 
that cannot be used as collateral in debt contracts, and so lenders will demand higher interest 
rates, creating a diminution in the leverage level (Zurigat, 2009).  Besides, profitability and 
debt are also negatively related, i.e., more profitable firms will become less levered over time 
because they prefer internal finance instead of external funds, as predicted by the Pecking 
Order Theory. However, the relation between the tangibility and leverage is against the 
expectations. According to Ferri and Jones (1979), this happens because tangible assets can 
increase the variability of firm’s income, delaying the access to debt. Moreover, firm size 
and leverage are negatively related, as predicted by the Pecking Order Theory, which is also 
against the expectations. Nevertheless, the exclusion of industry dummy variables presents a 
positive relation between firm size and leverage, although this variable loses statistical 
significance.  
Concerning the peer firm averages, the independent variables that present significant effect 
in explaining the leverage level are the peer firm leverage, firm size, profitability and 
tangibility. The peer firm average leverage presents a strongly negatively relation with the 
firm leverage. The negative sign suggests that peer firms’ leverage affects firm i in a similar 
way as firm i’s leverage. In addition, compared to firm-specific characteristics, peer firm 
financial policies have a significantly larger impact on capital structure, suggesting that the 
primary channel through which peer firms may influence capital structure is via peer firms’ 
policy decisions. In both models (2) and (3), the peer firm average characteristic that presents 
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more impact is profitability, while growth opportunities have not shown a statistical 
significance. 
According to Appendix A, none of the explanatory variables are extremely correlated, except 
the growth opportunities of firms and their peer firms within the industry, which could 
explain why growth opportunities of peer firms have not a statically significance.  All the 
other coefficients below 0.5 suggest that there is no significant multicollinearity between 
those variables. 
In sum, the results indicate that firms’ leverage decisions are significantly influenced by the 
leverage decisions of their peers within the industry, which reveal that the peer firms have a 
significant effect and an important role in determining variation in corporate leverage ratios. 
4.2. Sensitivity of Peer Firms  
Given the importance of herding behavior in the sense of determining the firms’ capital 
structure, this section examines whether firms mimic one another. First of all, for each 
industry-year combination, firms are classified into three groups (Table 5) based on lagged 
values for firm-specific characteristics, such as market share (sales divided by industry sales), 
profitability and growth opportunities. Leaders are those firms above the third quartile of the 
distribution. However, the leaders’ firms according to market share were defined above 25%, 
being more consistent with values obtained. Followers are those firms below the third quartile 
of the distribution, in which the middle group of firms are those between the first and the 
third quartile, and the low group of firms are those below the first quartile. 
Table 5 – Number of firms in each group classification of leaders and followers 
 Market Share Profitability 
Growth 
Opportunities 
Leaders – Big/ High 99 176 176 
Followers – Middle  373 296 296 
Followers – Small/ Low 208 208 208 
Total Number of Firms 680 680 680 
Table 5 presents the number of firms in each group classification based on lagged values for 
firm-specific characteristics, such as market share, profitability and growth opportunities. 
Industries are defined by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. 
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Table 6 – Estimation results of Sensitivity Analysis of Peer Firms 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
Growth 
Opportunities 
c 6.159*** 
(3.152) 
4.845** 
(2.396) 
3.909** 
(2.164) 
Peer Firm Average Leverage × 
Group1 
-3.440*** 
(-4.496) 
-3.462*** 
(-4.152) 
-3.050*** 
(-3.490) 
Peer Firm Average Leverage × 
Group2 
-2.907*** 
(-4.122) 
-3.365*** 
(-4.062) 
-3.020*** 
(-3.437) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics    
Firm Size -0.454** 
(-1.991) 
-0.279** 
(-1.148) 
-0.170 
(-0.784) 
Growth  0.145 
(0.420) 
-0.053 
(-0.181) 
0.019 
(0.062) 
Profitability -2.593*** 
(-3.052) 
-1.920** 
(-2.197) 
-2.562*** 
(-2.810) 
Tangibility -0.766 
(-1.198) 
-0.931 
(-1.519) 
-0.601 
(-0.991) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
Firm Size -0.178** 
(-1.981) 
-0.073 
(-1.215) 
-0.067 
(-1.165) 
Growth -0.265*** 
(-3.012) 
-0.369*** 
(-3.777) 
-0.259*** 
(-2.593) 
Profitability -0.178 
(-0.628) 
-0.620* 
(-1.731) 
-0.433 
(-1.434) 
Tangibility -0.141 
(-0.936) 
-0.172 
(-1.583) 
-0.225* 
(-1.689) 
    
R2 0.485 0.446 0.406 
Adjusted R2 0.439 0.407 0.364 
F-statistic 10.596*** 11.520*** 9.772*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Observations 307 384 384 
Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average leverage interacts with 
indicator variables identifying the lower and higher third of distribution of lagged values within industry-year 
combination for firm-specific measures, such as market share, profitability, and growth opportunities. Group 1 
is defined by follower firms and group 2 by leader firms. The subsample of firms excludes the middle third of 
the distribution for each regression. The dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined by three-
digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific characteristics’ variables are lagged 
1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-statistics robust to within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity 
are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% 
and *** at 1%.  
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Table 6 presents the sensitivity of peer’s financial policies of some firms within the industry, 
if they are more or less sensitive to their peer firms. So, we estimate the equation (3.1) for 
each firm-specific characteristic presented in Table 5, excluding the middle third of the 
distribution, as adopted by Leary and Roberts (2014). Group 1 is defined by follower firms 
and group 2 by leader firms. 
Similarly, to the previous section, we perform three statistic tests for each indicator variable: 
F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande multiplier (LM) and the Hausman test, to identify the most 
appropriate model, (Breusch and Pagan, 1980; Hausman, 1978). The most suitable model 
includes industry and year dummies to control for variables that are constant across industries 
and over time, respectively, and to capture the influence of aggregate trends. However, the 
model with only year dummy variables included are also displayed as well in Appendix B. 
The results show that follower firms are more sensitive to their peers than are the leader firms 
within the industry. Market share is the indicator variable that presents the most significant 
difference between peer firms’ average leverage, i.e., smaller firms are more sensitive to their 
peer firms than the bigger firms, as presented by Leary and Roberts (2014). Moreover, less 
profitable firms also reveal more sensitivity to peer firms than their counterparts. Concerning 
growth opportunities, there is also evidence, although not as strong as the other indicator 
variables mentioned previously. 
4.3. Leader-follower Model 
Table 7 analyzes whether peer firms reveal herding behavior, following a leader-follower 
model in which less successful firms are influenced by more successful firms within the 
industry. Thus, firms are classified into two groups, leaders and followers, within each 
industry-year, in which we define these groups according to different measures of success, 
such as market share and profitability (see Table 5). The leader firms are excluded from the 
sample, analyzing only the follower firms. Then, we estimate the model (3.1) on this 
subsample using the peer firm leverage of the leader firms, instead of the follower firms. 
Hereupon, we are examining whether follower firms are sensitive to the corporate financial 
policies of leader firms. 
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Table 7 – Estimation results of the Leader-follower Model 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
c 1.183 
(1.036) 
0.180 
(0.169) 
Leader Firm Average Leverage -0.048 
(-0.442) 
-0.114 
(-0.860) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.013 
(0.075) 
0.050 
(0.346) 
Growth  0.202 
(0.858) 
-0.070 
(-0.418) 
Profitability -0.262 
(-0.419) 
-0.007 
(-0.016) 
Tangibility -0.400 
(-0.797) 
-0.103 
(-0.211) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.085** 
(-3.081) 
0.048 
(1.378) 
Growth -0.307*** 
(-4.008) 
-0.053 
(-0.681) 
Profitability -0.445*** 
(-2.945) 
-1.088*** 
(-3.079) 
Tangibility -0.290*** 
(-3.552) 
-0.124 
(-1.017) 
   
R2 0.225 0.287 
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.252 
F-statistic 6.733*** 8.044*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Observations 581 504 
Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average 
leverage is replaced by leader firm average leverage. The subsample of firms 
includes the lower and middle third of the distribution (i.e., Followers firms) for 
each regression. The dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined 
by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics’ variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-
statistics robust to within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in 
parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Similarly, to the previous section, we perform three statistic tests for each measure of success: 
F-test, Breush-Pagan Lagrande multiplier (LM) and the Hausman test, to identify the most 
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appropriate model, (Breusch and Pagan, 1980; Hausman, 1978). The most suitable model 
includes industry and year dummies to control for variables that are constant across industries 
and over time, respectively, and to capture the influence of aggregate trends. However, the 
model with only year dummy variables included are also displayed as well Appendix C. 
According to the table 7, the results show no statistically significance, which suggests that 
follower firms are not sensitive to leader firms in financial policy choices. Therefore, the 
capital structure of smaller firms and less profitable firms are not influenced by the leverage 
of their more successful counterparts within the industry. This result contradicts the 
conclusion obtained by Leary and Roberts (2014). Furthermore, for both measures of 
success, peer firm average characteristics also present no significant effect on firm leverage. 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we further perform two robustness checks to test the results presented in the 
previous section, complementing the empirical analysis. Firstly, the group of follower firms 
was divided into two groups within each industry-year (see Table 5), estimating only whether 
middle third of follower firms’ distribution are driven by a leader-follower model. Lastly, we 
perform a falsification test by re-estimating the regression analysis using the sample of leader 
firms and the peer firm leverage of the followers. 
4.4.1. Leader-follower Model 
The results presented in table 8 show statistically significance, suggesting that some follower 
firms within the industry are sensitive to leader firms in financial policy decisions. Therefore, 
for both measures of success considered, the capital structure of middle third firms’ 
distribution are influenced by the leverage of their more successful counterparts within the 
industry. However, the leader firm average leverage variables of the different measures of 
success present opposite signals. Market share presents a positive signal of this variable, 
which means that leader firm leverage has a positive impact in follower firm leverage. The 
negative signal presented by profitability suggests that leader firm leverage affect follower 
firm leverage in a similar way as follower firm leverage. Apart from that, there was also 
analysed whether low third of follower firms’ distribution are driven by a leader-follower 
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model (see Appendix D). Nevertheless, the results presented no statistically significance, 
being consistent to the previous section. 
Table 8 – Estimation results of the Leader-follower Model, excluding low third of follower 
firms’ distribution 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
c 0.119 
(0.849) 
1.472 
(1.477) 
Leader Firm Average Leverage 0.181** 
(2.275) 
-0.271** 
(-2.463) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.086** 
(2.347) 
-0.116 
(-0.807) 
Growth  -0.040 
(-0.229) 
-0.090 
(-0.511) 
Profitability -0.743** 
(-2.037) 
0.106 
(0.218) 
Tangibility 0.382*** 
(2.830) 
-0.717 
(-1.598) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.006 
(-0.201) 
0.027 
(0.864) 
Growth -0.011 
(-0.120) 
0.054 
(0.904) 
Profitability -1.232*** 
(-4.306) 
-1.640*** 
(-3.889) 
Tangibility -0.229*** 
(-3.154) 
-0.210* 
(-1.932) 
   
R2 0.290 0.335 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.276 
F-statistic 9.089*** 5.687*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Not Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Observations 373 296 
Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average 
leverage is replaced by leader firm average leverage. The subsample of firms 
excludes the lower and upper third of the distribution for each regression. The 
dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined by three-digit CAE-
Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific characteristics’ 
variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-statistics robust to 
within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each 
coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%.  
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4.4.2. Follower-leader Model 
Table 9 – Estimation results of the Follower-leader Model 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
c 2.633 
(1.323) 
0.108 
(0.301) 
Follower Firm Average Leverage -0.116 
(-0.365) 
-0.312 
(-0.630) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.036 
(-0.191) 
0.310* 
(1.722) 
Growth  0.511 
(1.591) 
0.252 
(0.674) 
Profitability 0.053 
(0.057) 
0.340 
(0.252) 
Tangibility 0.499 
(0.969) 
0.544 
(1.269) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.326 
(-1.063) 
-0.139 
(-1.361) 
Growth -0.314 
(-1.663) 
-0.666*** 
(-2.675) 
Profitability -0.927* 
(-1.744) 
-0.790 
(-1.462) 
Tangibility 0.195 
(1.073) 
-0.491* 
(-1.874) 
   
R2 0.440 0.292 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.221 
F-statistic 2.423*** 4.097*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Not Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Observations 99 176 
Table 9 presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average 
leverage is replaced by follower firm average leverage. The subsample of firms 
includes the upper third (i.e., Leaders firms) of the distribution for each regression. 
The dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined by three-digit 
CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics’ variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-
statistics robust to within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in 
parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  
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Table 9 analyzes whether leader firms are driven by a follower-leader model, i.e., whether 
more successful firms are influenced by less successful firms. The results show no significant 
effect, statistically or economically, which allows us to conclude that leader firms’ capital 
structure decisions appear insensitive to the follower firms. This conclusion is also presented 
by Leary and Roberts (2014). 
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5. Conclusions 
The main goal of this research was to investigate whether an individual firm is sensitive to 
peer firms within the industry on capital structure decisions and whether peer firm behavior 
is driven by a leader-follower model in which less successful firms are influenced by more 
successful firms, using panel data of 85 Portuguese firms of 9 industries for the period of 
2008 to 2015. 
The results show that peer firm averages that present significant effect in explaining the 
capital structure policy are the leverage, firm size, profitability and tangibility of peer firms.  
The peer firm average leverage presents a strongly negatively relation with the firm leverage, 
which suggests that peer firms’ leverage affects firm i in a similar way as firm i’s leverage. 
In addition, compared to firm-specific characteristics, peer firm financial policies have a 
significantly larger impact on capital structure, suggesting that the primary channel through 
which peer firms may influence capital structure is via peer firms’ policy decisions. These 
results contradict the researches developed by Filbeck et al. (1996), and Oruç and Sen (2009), 
in which they found no support for herding behavior of firms within the industry. 
Furthermore, it is possible to conclude that herding behavior is concentrated among smaller 
and less successful firms, which reveals more sensitivity to their peer firms than the 
counterparts within the industry, being consistent with the conclusion of the study made by 
Leary and Roberts (2014). However, only some followers’ firms are influenced by the 
leverage of their more successful counterparts within the industry. Given this, since some 
smaller and less successful firms are sensitive to their leader peer firms within the industry, 
the herding behavior of managers in capital structure decisions might suggest a connection 
to the informational cascade theory. By contrast, the capital structure decisions of leader 
firms are insensitive to their less successful peer firms.  
The peer firm effect, that captures the potential herding behavior in capital structure 
decisions, helps to understand the managers' behavior. Most theories about the capital 
structure usually ignore the herding effect in corporate financing decisions, which leads to 
asking if they are not incomplete considering the results obtained. 
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In sum, this research has shown that managers do not make isolated decisions in determining 
the optimal capital structure of firms. As such, the financing decisions and characteristics of 
peer firms are significant determinants of corporate financial policies.  
This research presents some limitations. The first one is the use of book leverage and the 
exclusion of market leverage. Moreover, the data available severely restricts our capacity to 
develop proxies for other determinants of capital structure, which could affect the statistical 
inference and consequentially the results. Lastly, the sample period includes the international 
financial crisis, which may have affected the results, and therefore the question remains 
whether the conclusions are generalizable. 
Lastly, regarding future research suggestions, this work can be applied to a more extent 
sample based on the significant and other countries. Most of the studies developed are for 
firms from United States. Besides, the sample can also include more years in order to estimate 
a dynamic model for firms’ capital structure, thus making it possible to isolate the “crisis” 
effect.  
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Appendixes 
A – Correlation matrix 
Correlations 
 Peer Firm Averages Firm-specific Factors 
Lev Lev Size Growth Prof Tang Size Growth Prof Tang 
 Lev 1.000 0.131 0.192 0.070 -0.063 0.220 0.101 -0.077 -0.147 -0.017 
Peer Firm 
Averages 
Lev  1.000 0.484 0.130 -0.248 0.498 0.308 0.127 -0.071 0.239 
Size   1.000 0.046 0.361 0.323 0.469 0.033 0.159 0.161 
Growth    1.000 0.143 0.111 0.030 0.613 0.049 0.046 
Prof     1.000 -0.109 0.227 0.078 0.192 -0.010 
Tang      1.000 0.239 0.077 -0.010 0.162 
Firm-
specific 
Factors 
Size       1.000 0.008 0.114 0.032 
Growth        1.000 0.118 0.031 
Prof         1.000 -0.135 
Tang          1.000 
Variables – Lev represents Leverage; Size: Firm Size; Growth: Growth Opportunities; Prof: Profitability; Tang: Tangibility. 
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B – Estimation results of Sensitivity Analysis to Peer Firms, excluding Industry Fixed Effects 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
Growth 
Opportunities 
c -0.135 
(-0.588) 
-0.066 
(-0.326) 
-0.034 
(-0.190) 
Peer Firm Average Leverage × 
Group1 
-0.912*** 
(-3.779) 
-0.706*** 
(-2.968) 
-0.432* 
(-1.726) 
Peer Firm Average Leverage × 
Group2 
-0.318 
(-1.370) 
-0.604** 
(-2.451) 
-0.372 
(-1.615) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics    
Firm Size 0.275*** 
(4.824) 
0.204*** 
(4.170) 
0.158*** 
(2.704) 
Growth  0.461 
(1.128) 
0.168 
(0.627) 
0.290 
(0.804) 
Profitability -1.951*** 
(-3.013) 
-1.245** 
(-1.993) 
-1.808*** 
(-3.501) 
Tangibility 1.031*** 
(4.480) 
0.924*** 
(4.774) 
0.674*** 
(4.059) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics    
Firm Size -0.097** 
(-2.351) 
-0.014 
(-0.561) 
-0.020 
(-0.826) 
Growth -0.363*** 
(-3.026) 
-0.435*** 
(-2.862) 
-0.351** 
(-2.497) 
Profitability -0.221 
(-0.922) 
-0.746* 
(-1.877) 
-0.600** 
(-2.222) 
Tangibility -0.058 
(-0.554) 
-0.134* 
(-1.666) 
-0.131 
(-1.596) 
    
R2 0.199 0.190 0.159 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.153 0.120 
F-statistic 4.219*** 5.064*** 4.076*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Not Included Not Included Not Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Observations 307 384 384 
Table B presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average leverage interacts with 
indicator variables identifying the lower and higher third of distribution of lagged values within industry-year 
combination for firm-specific measures, such as market share, profitability, and growth opportunities. The 
subsample of firms excludes the middle third of the distribution for each regression. The dependent variable is 
the firm leverage. Industries are defined by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and 
firm-specific characteristics’ variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-statistics robust 
to within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical 
significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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C – Estimation results of the Leader-Follower Model, excluding Industry Fixed Effects 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
c -0.130 
(-0.931) 
0.059 
(0.414) 
Leader Firm Average Leverage 0.032 
(0.481) 
-0.074 
(-1.514) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.175*** 
(5.770) 
0.057** 
(2.381) 
Growth  0.306 
(1.224) 
-0.067 
(-0.366) 
Profitability -1.122*** 
(-3.713) 
-1.048*** 
(-3.554) 
Tangibility 0.551*** 
(3.911) 
0.461*** 
(3.618) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.056** 
(-2.252) 
0.051*** 
(4.870) 
Growth -0.284*** 
(-2.631) 
-0.072 
(-0.799) 
Profitability -0.593** 
(-2.410) 
-1.211*** 
(-4.136) 
Tangibility -0.207*** 
(-3.408) 
-0.042 
(-0.833) 
   
R2 0.176 0.231 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.205 
F-statistic 7.508*** 9.124*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Not Included Not Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Observations 581 504 
Table C presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average 
leverage is replaced by leader firm average leverage. The subsample of firms 
includes the lower and middle third of the distribution (i.e., Followers firms) for 
each regression. The dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined 
by three-digit CAE-Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific 
characteristics’ variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-
statistics robust to within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in 
parenthesis under each coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 
10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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D – Estimation results of the Leader-follower Model, excluding middle third of follower 
firms’ distribution 
 Leverage 
Market Share Profitability 
c 1.265 
(0.541) 
-1.650 
(-0.799) 
Leader Firm Average Leverage -0.001 
(-0.001) 
0.079 
(0.441) 
Peer Firm Average Characteristics   
Firm Size 0.070 
(0.167) 
0.274 
(0.879) 
Growth  0.499 
(1.498) 
-0.059 
(-0.192) 
Profitability -1.284 
(-1.235) 
0.432 
(0.418) 
Tangibility 0.121 
(0.137) 
0.829 
(1.043) 
Firm-Specific Characteristics   
Firm Size -0.248** 
(-2.030) 
0.066 
(1.184) 
Growth -0.363*** 
(-3.368) 
-0.188* 
(-1.851) 
Profitability 0.031 
(0.078) 
-1.220*** 
(-3.551) 
Tangibility -0.018 
(-0.066) 
0.022 
(0.145) 
   
R2 0.373 0.312 
Adjusted R2 0.291 0.222 
F-statistic 4.545*** 3.457*** 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Observations 208 208 
Table D presents the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). The peer firm average 
leverage is replaced by leader firm average leverage. The subsample of firms 
excludes the middle and upper third of the distribution for each regression. The 
dependent variable is the firm leverage. Industries are defined by three-digit CAE-
Rev. 3 code. Peer firm average characteristics and firm-specific characteristics’ 
variables are lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. T-statistics robust to 
within-firm correlation and heteroskedasticity are reported in parenthesis under each 
coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 
1%.  
 
 
